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Abstract
1his article examines the bargaining interface between petroleum-rich developing countries and
large multinational corporations, with an application to the case of Kazakhstan, formerly a
Soviet Republic. In the analytic narrative tradition, this ankle combines a case study with an
extensive form game, applying Theodore Moran's dynamic bargaining theory, which posits that,
over time and through repeated interaction, devdoping countries do better for themsdves, incre
mentally improving their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction, thereby
advancing along a learning curve. The application of this theory is systematiz.ed through the
utilization ofgame theory; an extensive game modded on strategic, iterated bargaining behavior
between the two actors is introduced. 1his dynamic game allows for the recalculation ofstrate
gies based on the players' revealed moves, allowing for the concept of learning while doing. The
game is then applied to Kazakhstan's particular situation. The application of Moran's theory
through the use of a generalizable game provides a method for resource-rich developing coun
trier-panicularly those in the nascent stages ofdeveloping these industrier-to systematize the
negotiation process and accelerate their ascent on a bargaining learning curve.
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Introduction

In academic studies of the interface between large multinational corporations
(MNCs) and the devdoping countries that are the target of their investments,
scholars have noted that, over time and through repeated interaction, the
devdoping countries tend to do better for themselves. In other words, the
developing countries progress along a learning curve and incrementally
improve their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction: this is
the essence of Theodore Moran's dynamic bargaining model. This article
investigates whether the dynamic bargaining model can be systematically

applied, and therefore instructive, to resource-rich developing countries that
are in the early stages ofextractive industry development, countries such as the
former Soviet states. It proposes a new methodology for systematic application
by introducing an extensive form game modeled on strategic bargaining
behavior. The article then gives evidence from a case study of the country of
Kazakhstan and applies the game to Kazakhstan's specific situation.

Background and Dynamic Bargaining Theory
Over the past 40 years, much has been written regarding developing countries'
economic experiences in the area of non-renewable resource extraction. This
scholarly interest coincides with an exponential increase of both investments in
and development ofthese industries, and often focuses either upon the exploit
ative relationship between foreign-based MNCs and developing countries or
on the phenomenon known as the resource curse: a skewed economy in which
the state allows a single industry to dominate, to the detriment of all others.
Beginning in the 1970s, a small number of researchers took on this subject
with an eye to understanding how resource-rich developing countries could
do better for themselves within the context of their relationship with MNCs
(Moran 1974; Smith and Wells 1975; Vernon 1971). Building upon their
work, this article focuses its analysis on the bargaining interface between these
two parties, giving particular attention to Kazakhstan's experience.
Since unexploited resources are generally found in underdeveloped areas,
extractive corporations do business with developing countries, which, in turn,
depend upon the corporations for technological expertise and capital. Because
developing country legal systems generally are not sophisticated enough to
address all potential issues and areas relevant to an emerging oil industry, the
developing state most often negotiates a specific contract direcdy with each
MNC, one intended to cover all aspects of their agreement.
The two actors enter into these negotiations with markedly different back
grounds, panicularly at the outset. The MNC begins in a position of mono
poly control over technological capabilities to develop the potential deposit.
It also possesses a great deal of business and negotiation experience, both in
general and as specifically related to the oil industry. The developing country,
on the other hand, possesses litde bargaining experience, and begins the
negotiation process with an inexact knowledge of this industry. Further, the
state is inexperienced in numerous areas of business-legal, financial, and
environmental, to name a few-that are relevant to the development of an oil
industry.

Given the David-and-Goliath scenario described above, it was rather sur
prising when in the early 1970s, the following observation emerged in aca
demic circles: in examining the historical record of MNCs' and developing
countries' interaction, scholars found that, over time, agreements between the
two actors tended to be made on terms more and more favorable to the devel
oping country (Mikesell1971; Moran 1974; Smith and Wells 1975; Stoever
1981).
In his country study of the Chilean copper industry, Theodore Moran
(1974) formulated a testable hypothesis to explain this phenomenon. This
theory came to be known as the dynamic bargaining model. Moran posits that
there exists a learning curve for developing countries: over time, the countries
gain experience in bargaining and doing business-learning by doing-and
utilize this experience to become better negotiators. Through bargaining and
strategic interaction, the developing countries incrementally improve their
outcomes; they form contracts more favorable to their side--a notion he calls
"ascending the bargaining learning curve." & these states gain experience and
confidence through bargaining and doing business with MNCs, they will also
take steps to ensure that their indigenous populations gradually develop the
skills (monitoring, operating and supervising) necessary to reduce dependence
on the corporations.
Though developing countries initially may have little to no experience with
contract negotiations and inadequate or nonexistent laws regarding these con
tracts or the future industry being created, "Successful ventures ... provide an
incentive for the host country to develop skills and expertise appropriate to
the industry. Beginning with elementary attempts to tighten the bargaining
process, the country starts to move up a learning curve that leads from moni
toring industry behavior to replicating complicated corporate functions"
(Moran 1974:1).
Moran's theory builds on the Obsolescing Bargain Model developed by
Raymond Vernon (1971), which states that as soon as a bargain is struck, and
the corporation makes its initial investments, the bargaining positions of the
two parties begin to change. The promise ofinvestrnent is no longer a bargain
ing chip for the corporation, and it finds itself with sunk costs. It has incen
tives to stay in the country-to avoid losing these sunk costs and to bring the
project to fruition-in order to reap the financial rewards it envisioned in its
profit projections. As soon as the risks associated with the initial investment
have disappeared and the corporation begins to realize a profit, which in the
case of petroleum is often a windfall, the host country begins to question the
distribution of benefits from the original contract. In retrospect, such agree
ments "invariably have the appearance... of the strong [company] cheating

the weak [country]" {Moran 1974:160). As a result, the developing countries
call for renegotiations of the original terms of the contract.
Up to the mid-1970s, scholars of concession arrangements traditionally
viewed these contracts as a one-time bargain, reflecting a single set of negotia
tions between the two parties, in which one party "wins" and the other "loses."
Smith and Wells (1975) and Moran (1974) argued that this notion was out of
step with reality, given the numerous renegotiations and even expropriations
witnessed in the world oil industry during the 1960s. Furthermore, the stark
win/loss scenario employed within static analysis was also not a reflection of
reality. It portrayed bargains as zero-sum games. In fact, contract negotiations
offer the opportunity for both sides to realize a mutuality of interests, in the
form of non-zero sum games, where bargaining is the method to determine
the division of the fixed set of rewards-or of the collective "pie"-between
the two sides. Thus both players may benefit.
Smith and Wells thus contributed to the scholarly understanding of the
bargaining process by stressing its dynamic nature (1975). They pointed out
that the existing static bargaining models overlooked changes that occurred
both within the industry and within the host country, and how these changes
shift the strength of bargaining positions for each party over time, which is
ultimately reflected in the changing nature of the contracts. They issued a call
for future researchers to take into account the economic, social, and political
forces at work in the host country, the interests of the MNC and its position
in the global industry, and the dynamics occurring within the industry itself
when analyzing contract negotiations (1975). Smith and Wells lamented that
game theory, at the time, did not offer a non-static model that satisfied their
desire for a more dynamic view. However, they utilize the underlying rational
ization for employing game theory as an important justification for a dynamic
approach to the bargaining process, arguing that each side must thoroughly
understand the bargaining interests and positions of the other party. Each
actor must perform a thorough analysis of not only its opponent but also of
itself to understand fully the situation at hand, as well as where each party's
bargaining strengths lie, and what therefore can be negotiated. It is this same
necessity of specifying all assumptions and stating everything known about
each player that underlies game theory's contribution to understanding the
situation at hand.
In the introductory chapter ofhis case study, a compilation of mineral-rich
Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, Raymond Mikesell (1971)
provides a comprehensive preliminary review of the range of economic, polit
ical, and social areas potentially affected by mineral development and the host
country/MNC relationship. However, when he attempts to measure these

effects on the host country, Mikesell utilizes exclusively numerical economic
data. Not surprisingly, perhaps, he meets with some of the same challenges
that the developing countries themselves faced. To give one salient example,
he finds a significant differential between posted prices and realized prices for
mineral exports (Mikesell 1971), which complicates computations. He also
laments the paucity of data in many instances.
Even so, Bruce McKern (1993) reports that most ofthe studies undertaken
to measure the costs and benefits for both parties in the resource-development
interface employ numerical economic data to estimate the proportion of rev
enues retained by the host country relative to the total sales value of the natu
ral resource. This article rejects the notion that limited economic data can
accurately gauge the effects of a phenomenon with far-reaching political,
social, and economic implications. Pure economic or numerical data cannot
reflect or measure the importance ofsuch diverse and complex issues as envi
ronmental concerns, technology transfer, indigenous employment demands,
or the promise of future investment for the host country. It is not sufficient
simply to calculate whether state revenues have increased as a result ofoil indus
try contracts; this measures but one small aspect of contract negotiations
whether the state can bargain for a higher profit tax rate, for example-which
may be the result ofpurely exogenous variables, such as the skyrocketing price
of oil. It hardly would be conclusive to call such negotiations "evidence of
learning." Only a bigger-picture analysis can allow us to conclude that a devel
oping country has learned and has done better for itself over time or, as we
have defined this concept, whether it has advanced in its overall level ofskills
and the capacity to deal with all aspects of its oil industry, as well as demon
strated the ability to negotiate for more of the collective pie with the MNCs.
For such an analysis, economic data alone is not sufficient; a broader histori
cal, social, and political context must be established.
Curiously, both Mikesell (1971) and Moran (1974) rejected the use of
game theory, despite their acknowledgment of the benefits that its applica
tion could bring, benefits based on the very same arguments for its use put
forth by Morrow (1994) two decades later. According to Morrow, formally
writing down one's argument forces the modeler to expose all stated and
unstated assumptions and to see the situation more realistically from all
points of view, not just from one's own. Mikesell (1971), however, laments
the fact that "Bargaining would be far less complex and the outcome more
readily predictable ifeach party could estimate confidendy the intentions and
the relative bargaining strength of his opponent" (p. 44). But this present
article argues that these are precisely the benefits we can expect by systemati
cally employing the tools of rational choice and game theory, given the more

complete understanding of the entire bargaining scenario brought about
through the appropriate use of game theory methodology. The formalizing of
this methodology forces the informed, rational actors to take into consider
ation the bigger picture, including each actor's motivation and strategies and
the potential consequences of his or her actions or decisions.
This article argues for the use ofgame theory on the same grounds that both
scholars, Mikesdl and Moran, rejected it. An daborate, dynamic, and descrip
tive modd of the changing balance of power between foreign investors and a
host government is useful as a framework for analyzing the actual course of
rdations, and as a standard against which to measure the actual performance
of the host country. It is only fair, however, to point out again that both schol
ars' rejection ofgame theory was likdy affected by a zeitgeist tilted against the
methodology. This study not only takes advantage of the recent renewal of
interest and developments in this methodology, but also of the broader range
of its application for the social sciences in general. This includes the acknowl
edgements of its benefits as a descriptive tool, and not exclusively a mathemat
ical one.
On a related note, McKern (1993) points out that over time, host countries
have shifted their bargaining priorities away from a focus solely on fiscal ben
efits and toward a more complex schedule of desiderata designed to capture
direct and indirect benefits. The application of a more descriptive or extensive
form game thus fits more appropriately in this case, for a reduced mathemati
cal form of the methodology can overlook the broader range of the actors'
concerns, which can include political and social considerations in addition to
the more simply mathematically measurable financial issues.
Logically, the need for a methodology that allows for more complexity fol
lows from the fact that negotiations between the developing countries and
MNCs have become more multifarious (McKern 1993). Over the years, host
countries have moved from an initial position of viewing MNC royalty pay
ments as a "windfall reward" to becoming competent negotiators bargaining
over taxation, ownership, and management measures, as well as over environ
mental, employment, infrastructure, future investment, technology transfer,
and local economy concerns, among others (Moran 1974). Some of these
issues are more difficult to measure quantitatively than others. This is where a
descriptive methodology becomes important, highlighting the continued need
to rely upon the case study, a point on which all of the scholars mentioned
above would agree, for they all have employed it in their research.
And yet, it is important not simply to stop at the case study level. Many
scholars make the assertion that qualitative and quantitative methods comple
ment one another and ultimately must be combined (Odell2001). This article

provides a starting point for a systematic, game theoretic analysis ofthe MNC
developing country's bargaining interface, one that may be applied across mul
tiple case studies, thereby combining the qualitative with the quantitative.
As noted above, in the 1970s, scholars ofthis subject lamented the fact that
game theory, at the time, did not offer a non-static, non-zero-sum model that
satisfied their desire for a more dynamic view, taking into account the eco
nomic, social, and political forces at work in the host country, the interests of
the MNC and its position in the global industry, and the dynamics occurring
within the industry itself when analyzing contract negotiations. This assertion
is in line with James Morrow's (1994:2) claim that, during the 1960s and
1970s, the performance of game theory lagged behind its early promise, and
as a result, "Many became convinced that game theory was inadequate to
answer most central questions in the social sciences" (p. 2).
Over the ensuing thirty-five years, however, considerable advances have
been made in game theory methodology and application, particularly in the
areas of non-cooperative, dynamic, and iterated games, which are specifically
applicable to bargaining theory. Morrow goes on to argue that, now more than
ever, game theory provides a tool for all social scientists; formal developments
have pushed the methodology in ways not even imagined during its initial
development, and it should be used to address substantive issues that have
arisen in the field in the intervening years (Morrow 1994:3, emphasis added).
This article follows in the Analytic Narrative tradition, combining the case
study method with an extensive form game, to examine the choices of indi
viduals involved in strategic, interdependent decision-making (Bates et al.
1998).
Let us return, however, to Moran's theory. As stated above, negotiations
between the host country and the oil corporation are no longer viewed as a
one-time occurrence. Logically, the developing country seeks to strengthen its
bargaining position. It does this in various ways, over time, by taking strategic
initiatives. These may include learning more about the oil industry in general
and learning what its cohorts have been able to achieve around the world. A
state enterprise may also be established by the developing country in the
attempt to monitor, supervise, manage, and eventually operate some or all of
its own industry. It may create programs to train indigenous workers in the
above areas. The state can also negotiate that a proportion of the workforce
employed by the MNCs be citizens of the country, that certain products pur
chased by the corporations be locally produced, and that the equipment that
must be imported by the MNC becomes the property of the state upon its
arrival. Further, the state may negotiate for an increased level of equity in the
contract itself, or for a share of the final product.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of negotiable items; each country
must decide what will work best for its individual development path. Yet each
of these issues represents a component oflearning on the part ofthe develop
ing country. Each concession that the state successfully negotiates chips away
at the monopoly of information and control that the MNC originally pos
sessed, and cumulatively they shift the relative strength of bargaining toward
the host country (Moran 1974).
A major critique leveled against Moran's theory is that it fails to take into
account the fact that MNCs also face a learning curve. Indeed they do, and by
treating the MNC as an exogenous variable in the bargaining interface, the
model treats it as a constant, while the state is allowed to change, improve, and
learn. Though the original intent of this study was to include an analysis giv
ing equal consideration to the MNC's bargaining experience, this intent even
tually proved to be beyond its scope, as the description of negotiations would
have been twice as complicated and lengthy, and its focus on developing coun
tries would have been sacrificed.
Nor does this analysis comprise a comprehensive list of all the potential
players that could affect the bargaining scenario. There are, in fact, many
actors with the potential to influence the contractual decision-making process:
the multinational's home country, other MNCs with an interest in the out
come, the developing country's state oil enterprise, and non-governmental
organizations or other interest groups. For the purposes ofsimplification and
feasibility, this article has narrowed the number of actors examined to two;
adding more would have been beyond the scope of this inquiry and would
have made the games extremely complicated.
We thus characterize contract negotiations between the MNC and the
developing country as strategic interactions between two actors bargaining to
find a mutually acceptable arrangement, even while each attempts to maxi
mize its own share of the pie. Such a generalizable situation may be analyzed
through the methodology of game theory, the subject to which we now turn.

Game Theory and Bayesian Equilibrium Analysis
By applying the methodology ofgame theory to the analysis ofthis bargaining
interface, this article responds to a call issued by various scholars for increased
use ofgame theory to study and understand multinational corporations (Caves
1996; Graham 1998). Edward Graham calls it "surprising-and even dismay
ing-that so little effort has been made to rethinking MNC behavior in light
of new [game] theory" (1998:67).

Yet, because game theory analyzes all potential strategies for each of the
actors involved-to the extent that this is possible, given that omniscience is
not-the opportunity also exists for developing countries to gain significant
insight into their own behavior and strategies, into what wUl make them more
efficient bargainers. In other words, if we are able to identify a bargaining
learning curve for developing countries, it may be possible for a country to
progress along this curve at an accelerated rate (or make it steeper) if it better
understands competitive strategies associated with the bargaining process.
When contracts are negotiated between the MNC and the LDC, the inter
face conforms to the central tenets of game theory. The bargaining between
the actors may be considered strategic interaction. This feature of the negotia
tion dynamic means that the actual bargaining position of each actor at each
decision point is a function of the perceived strategic preferences of the other
player (Dixit and Skeath 1999). The perceptions of each actor's own strategic
preferences, as well as those of the other actors, are modified through a learn
ing process. This learning process, or the updating of beliefs and strategies in
response to the other actor's moves, may be illustrated through a concept
called Bayesian equilibrium analysis.
The game modeled in this article is an example of international bargaining.
According to Morrow (1994), such games should not be viewed in the same
way as a game of chance or a game against nature with given, fixed probabili
ties. Instead, the negotiation process is more accurately characterized as strate
gic decision-making for each actor under conditions of uncertainty regarding
the behavior of his or her counterpart, who, in turn, is trying to estimate the
other's likely behavior. Each actor makes a probability assessment of his or her
counterpart's possible responses shaped by perceptions of the other actor's
preferences. In this way, the probabilities are not given or fixed-they are
subjective and subject to revision.
The game is presented in the extensive form, and at each decision node, the
player is faced with two choices. Additionally, each actor is seen as a unified
entity. These assumptions are clearly a simplification ofreality, but this is not to
be seen as a weakness or liability of this methodology. On the contrary, game
theory's strength lies not in its ability to accurately describe a complicated situ
ation, but rather in its ability to generalize a strategic interaction and to be able
to apply it to other similar situations in order to tell us what behavior we should
expect as a consequence of the generalized theories (Morrow 1994).
The strategizing and recalculating process for actors within the constructs of
a bargaining game may be described as follows: each actor identifies the vari
ous negotiating outcomes available; these are ranked to establish the actor's
preference ordering. Each player then formulates a probability assessment of

the opponent's perceived preferences and uses this assessment to predict the
opponent's most likely bargaining strategies.
A player's perceptions may be based upon previous interactions with, or the
historic reputation of, the opposing player. However, if there has been no
previous interaction between the actors, or if one actor is new to the industry
or bargaining scenario, there may be much room for error in the calculation
of probabilities due to misperceptions or lack of experience. Given this possi
bility, it is important to be able to recalculate strategies and probabilities once
the actor better understands the game and his or her opponent. In other
words, an actor's moves in the game reveal his or her preferences. The oppo
nent may then readjust, or reassess, his or her strategy based on a refined per
ception ofthe opposing player's preferences.lt is this possibility for readjustment
of beliefs in response to observed events that characterizes Bayesian equilib
rium analysis, and that allows for the concept of learning during the bargain
ing process.
In the bargaining scenario at hand, a collaborative effort can increase the
size of the pie to be divided, and thus the absolute returns to each party.
Moran's concept of a learning curve may be illustrated as in Figure 1.
Because game theory attempts to analyze all possible strategies for each of
the actors involved, the possibility exists for developing countries to gain sig
nificant insight into their own behavior and strategies, into what will make
them more efficient bargainers. If a developing country habitually applies a
rigorous methodology to the mapping out of its strategic interactions, it may
be possible to proceed more quickly along its learning curve, or along a steeper
curve, as illustrated by Moran's subsequent graph (figure 2).
The game presented in this article relies more heavily upon logic than on
complex mathematics. The choice to present the game in extensive form was
made to increase its applicability across countries. The purpose of the game is
to provide a methodological framework for the systematic analysis of the
negotiation process, within the context of Moran's learning curve concept. In
this way, the article examines Moran's assertion that developing countries learn
by doing, while positing that game theory offers a method by which develop
ing countries can systematize and better understand the bargaining process and
thus learn even more quickly how to be efficient bargainers--or to ascend the
learning curve at an accelerated rate. As a result, the game may be applied to
additional studies ofcountries to systematize analyses of bargaining between
the governments ofdeveloping countries and multinational corporations.

Figure 1 Moran's Learning Curve Illustrating Total Returns to the
Foreign Investor and the Host Country (Source: Moran 1974:162)
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the curves will not be smooth.
The Game

This article's game is an extensive-form, two-player, non-cooperative game
based on a model of bargaining under incomplete information. As Morrow
argues, "Extensive forms allow a more detailed analysis ofthe strategic interac
tion between two players than strategic forms do'' {1994:121).
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, a world consisting of two actors: the
MNC and the developing country (or state). We further assume that the
developing country has little to no experience in bargaining, while the MNC's
experience is extensive. In addition to bargaining experience, the MNC pos
sesses intricate technical, logistical, business, and legal knowledge ofall aspects
of the oil industry. The developing country, on the other hand, does not pos
sess such knowledge or experience.

Figure 2

Moran's Accelerated Learning Curve (Source: Moran
1974:167)
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We also assume that the government wants to remain in power. Further theo
rizing on this point is problematic, because the government may act to enrich
itself or it may act to increase the citizens' welfare by distributing the added
wealth---gained from bargaining-throughout the country.
The corporation, it is generally assumed, acts to maximize the company's
value to its shareholders. In this case, it searches for oilfields where it can best
employ its technological advantages and negotiates contracts to develop (and/
or refine, transport, and sell) oil from this location. We also assume that the
corporation in question has the technological capabilities to develop the oil in
the country and that it has previous experience in negotiating contracts with
states.

There are political as well as economic concerns for each actor. While the
government wants to stay in power politically, it has the potential to benefit
economically from bargaining with the corporation that motivates the under
taking; economic success generally translates to continued political power. At
the same time, the corporation wants to negotiate the best contract for itself,
economically speaking, and yet also desires political stability ofrule within the
state where its operations will be located. This is necessary in order for the state
to avoid disruptions related to political uprisings and to assure continued
operations and the enforcement oflaws.
In the case at hand, the state has a locational advantage: the oil is located
within its borders. The MNC must negotiate with the state in order to develop
the oil. On the other hand, the MNC has its own distinct advantages, the
most salient ofwhich are technological. The state cannot develop its oil on its
own, or it would presumably do so. It therefore needs the technological exper
tise of the MNC.
We have also assumed that the MNC has the advantage ofbargaining expe
rience. It has bargained with numerous countries before and understands,
better than the developing country, key concepts crucial to its industry, such
as transfer pricing and profit-sharing agreements. It is well informed about
standard business practices around the world, and about concessions obtained
regarding other oil concerns. It also has a dearer understanding of the pros
pects for developing the oil, since it can carry out its own feasibility studies
and exploration reports. Further, it employs a cadre ofexperts in many fields
engineers, lawyers, negotiators, and so forth-which the state likely does not
have at the initial stage.
Additionally, the portrayal of each actor as unitary is a simplification. For
example, Chevron is actually but one member of the TengizChevroil consor
tium to develop the Tengiz field. Even so, it is considered the consortium's
manager, holding 50% of its value, and Chevron itself is the single largest
contributor to Kazakhstan's GDP.
The choice of this model is based loosely on negotiations and any subse
quent renegotiations between Kazakhstan and Chevron. The author must rely
upon available public records and reports, and is not privy to exact knowledge
ofwhat transpired during the negotiation process, nor ofsome specific details
of the outcomes, as these are kept confidential. This is one reason that such
"real world" interactions, such as bribes or signing bonuses, are not included
in the model-though they may take place, and, if each side is aware of them,
they may be able to incorporate them into their bargaining calculations. How
ever, this researcher was not privy to such interactions, so they do not appear
in the following negotiation description.

In this game, we assume a situation where a developing state (S) and an
extractive energy multinational company (MNC) have realized that by applying
the technological advantages of the MNC to the locational advantages of the
State and, forming a contract for a project to develop the oil in question, they
can generate an added value (V) of 100. If the parties negotiate an agreement,
they will need to determine how to divide the project's added value (V) of 100
between them. An illustration of the game appears in figure 3.
The assumption of incomplete information is crucial for the model and is
represented by private information for each actor regarding certain payoffs.
The MNC possesses private information about its own sunk costs, and the
State has private information regarding how it values its reputation costs.
Information is revealed by the moves of the two players.
Each square, or node, represents a choice for one of the actors. There are
two branches from each choice node; these indicate the choices available to
the actor. The choice of any circle, if taken, represents an end to the game. The
outcomes for each player are indicated as values in parentheses at each circle.
The first value represents the outcome, or payoff, for the MNC, because it is
denoted Player 1 in this game, and the second value indicates the payoff for
the State, Player 2.
In the above game, the MNC makes the first move, in which it must decide
whether to enter into a contract with the state and therefore to invest or not
in devdoping the oil fields in question. In order to determine its best move,

Figure 3
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the MNC takes into consideration everything it knows about all stages of the
game, including its best moves as potential responses to the best moves of the
other player, and the probabilities with which it believes the other player will
act upon those moves. In order to calculate all of the possible outcomes and
decide on its best strategy, the player will utilize the concept of backward
induction, that is, choosing its best move at each terminal node and working
its way backward to determine which preceding moves are optimal by using
the projections of moves later in the game tree (Morrow 1994). This solution
concept, developed for extensive form games, provides a way to solve games
with limited information. A player forms conjectures about the uncertainties
it faces in the game. It revises these conjectures as it learns about the game
from the moves of the other players. This is where the possibility for learning,
or updating belie&, emerges.
If the MNC initially chooses not to invest, there is no contract. Each side
receives nothing (0,0) because the industry is not developed; this node's
payoffs are simple to calculate since it is a terminal node with no other play
possibilities. Ifit chooses to invest and agrees to form a contract with the State,
it must look to all future possibilities for moves and calculate its potential
payoffs, given what it believes the State will do.
We begin our backward induction at the final node's payoffs. If the MNC
initially invests and the State chooses to renegotiate the contract, the MNC
can either shut down operations or agree to renegotiate. If it decides to shut
down operations in protest, the payoffs are as follows: the MNC sacrifices the
sunk costs associated with the initial investment, and the State suffers the
reputation costs associated with reneging on a contract. The value of each of
these payoffs is private information known only to the side experiencing the
cost. While the MNC knows its own valuation of the sunk costs, it can only
speculate on how important the other player-the State-values its own repu
tation for upholding contracts, or how much it believes it would stand to lose
in the future with new bargaining parmers and a reputation for reneging, for
example, by violating a previously agreed-upon contract.
Ifthe MNC were to decide to engage the state in renegotiations, the payoffs
from V =100 would be 70 to the MNC and 30 to the State, with the caveat
that the MNC still must subtract its sunk costs (private information) from
this payoff.
Finally, taking the terminal node where the MNC has invested and the
State agrees to the contract, the payoffs from the initial added value M of 100
are divided as follows: 80 to the MNC and 20 to the State. We must again add
that the MNC subtracts its sunk costs from this payoff of80.
Player 2, the State, will employ the same method of backward induction to
analyze its own best move, given whether it believes the MNC will invest and

make a contract and whether the MNC will shut down operations or agree to
renegotiate. It possesses the same common knowledge about the game and all
the payoffs as the MNC does; neither knows the other's private information.
In order to calculate whether the MNC would choose to invest, we will
assume that it knows that its sunk costs are equal to -10, and it assumes that
the State would bear a reputation cost of -30 if it were to renegotiate a con
tract. It wants to make a credible threat of shutting down its operations if the
State insists upon renegotiation, even though it does not actually want this
outcome, because shutting down operations brings about the MNC's worst
outcome ofthe game (-1 0). It may tell the State outright that if it attempts to
renegotiate, the MNC would definitely shut down operations, and further
advise the State of the reputational dangers for renegotiators. The actual
outcome values remain private information, however, and the state will need
to determine its own values, given its own private information.
Let us calculate whether the MNC will make the initial investment and
agree to a contract. It is faced with a certain outcome ofO ifit does not invest.
Though it wants the State to believe it would shut down operations if faced
with renegotiations, the MNC calculates that it would receive a much better
payoff of 70 if it renegotiates and -10 if it shuts down operations. Rationally,
the MNC would opt to renegotiate and get the better payoff. Therefore, it
knows its payoffs, if it invests, are either 80 if the State agrees to the contract,
or 70 if the state renegotiates. In either case, the payoff is greater than 0 if the
MNC did not invest, so it will opt to invest, and given that its outcome is
greater with no renegotiations, it will attempt to convince the State that it
would shut down operations rather than renegotiate-in other words, it will
attempt a "credible threat."
Now we turn to the State for the next move. First, let us assume that the
State believes the MNC's sunk costs to be equal to -10, and its own reputation
costs to be a positive value of 10, because it believes that, if it can renegotiate
with the MNC, it will earn a reputation as a tough negotiator and will there
fore be able to negotiate more successfully with other MNCs in the future. If
the State finds the MNC's threat that it would shut down operations credible,
it might estimate with 9/10 probability that the MNC would shut down oper
ations and 1/10 probability that the MNC would agree to the renegotiations.
We can then calculate its expected payoff value for renegotiating: {9/10)*
(10) + (1110)*(30) "" 12. It is more likely to stay with the "sure thing" payoff
of 20 that it would receive for acquiescing or agreeing to the contract in the
first place.
Say, however, that a relevant event that had occurred wherein the State was
able to successfully make a demand of the MNC, not necessarily to renegoti

ate a contract, but to reduce a certain pollutant, for example, without the
MNC shutting down operations. An almost identical game tree could be used
to illustrate the above situation. Having thus learned from its success in a
similar situation, the State would be able to recalculate its belief ofthe MNC's
threat, or its expectations of whether the MNC would shut down operations,
given that it conceded to the State's demands on a relevant issue.
Given this updating of beliefs, let us go back to the game illustrated above,
and assume that the State recalculates the probability of the MNC shutting
down to be just 1/5 and the probability of the MNC agreeing to renegotiate
to be 4/5. We can now recalculate that instead of going for its "sure thing"
acquiescing payoff of20, it would opt for an expected payoff value from rene
gotiating of {115)*(10) + (4/5)*(30) = 26. It would thus initiate a renegotia
tion and ultimately receive a payoff of 30, while the MNC would receive the
renegotiated payoff of 70. By adjusting its beliefs and recalculating its proba
bilities and expected payoffs, the State adjusts its move and ultimately receives
a higher payoff. It has advanced on the learning curve, and receives a larger
proportion of the pie.

Case Study: Kazakhstan
After 55 years as a Soviet Republic, Kazakhstan attained sovereign status in
1991, when it seceded from the disintegrating Soviet Union. Finding itself a
nation extremely rich with oil deposits but technologically unable to develop
them, it opened its fields to foreign investment.
In the years following independence, Kazakhstan attempted to move as
quickly as possible away from a centrally planned economy. It initiated a mas
sive campaign to privatize virtually all of its industries and embarked on what
has been termed the "Sale of the Century." This included an "extraordinary
sale of most of its large resource extraction enterprises, formerly run by the
Soviet state, to mostly foreign companies over the relatively short period from
roughly 1994 to 1997" {Peck 2003:2).
Over the years, and with the benefit of hindsight, analysts have widely cri
tiqued Kazakhstan's handling of its fire sale, alleging that many of its poten
tially lucrative enterprises were given to foreigners at rock-bottom prices (Brill
Olcott 2002; Peck 2004). The government was also criticized for exempting
foreign investors from taxes, dearing their purchased enterprises of all former
debts, offering them reduced transport tariffs, and the like {Esentugelov 1997).
Though Kazakhstan's privatization efforts have been disparaged, so have those
of all the former Soviet States, as they each attempted, by varying degrees
and with varying levels ofsuccess, to leap from centrally planned economic

systems to market economies. The one thing all these states had in common
was that they embarked on this journey to capitalism "without a map"

(Schleifer and Treisman 2000).
As is the case for vinually all peuoleum-rich developing counuies, Kazakh
stan viewed the development of its oil sector as the lynchpin to the state's
overall economic growth. This industry produces quick, large, and often long
term financial returns; even if the peuoleum itself is not produced or profit
able for years, signing bonuses and start-up capital investments begin the
financial flows almost as immediately as the ink dries on the contracts.
Thus, from its independence, Kazakhstan has focused much ofits economic
energies on making contracts with foreign firms to develop this key sector. As
of 2002, the result has been that approximately half of all foreign-direct invest
ment into Kazakhstan has flowed to the petroleum sector, and this figure is
likely to have increased during the interim years. However, even though Peck
(2004) reports that there was widespread governmental agreement on the
need to privatize the oil industry, "rarely was there agreement on how to secure
that investment and yet retain control of the sector" {p. 144).
At independence, Kazakhstan was able to manage its own refineries, pipe
lines, and exports; in this respect it was ahead of many other developing
countries. However, the majority of petroleum refined in Kazakhstan during
its days as a republic had been sent from the Soviet Union. This was a vestige
of the centrally planned Soviet economy-an irony of which was that many
of Kazakhstan's own massive oil fields were left undeveloped, to the new
nation's benefit. Yet, as stated above, it was unable to develop these fields
independently.
Upon the dissolution of the USSR, Russia stopped exporting its oil to
Kazakhstan for refining. As a result, the country's refinery supply, as well as its
exports, dwindled. Not surprisingly, great hope was placed on the ability of
foreign investors to bring the country back on line as an oil-producing and
oil-exponing nation. However, during the late 1990s, privatization efforts in
the oil industry were often put on hold by political infighting between the
President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the various prime ministers who have
served since Kazakh independence. In fact, Kazakhstan's first two prime min
isters were dismissed amid allegations of corruption connected to the oil
industry (Peck 2004).
Though Kazakhstan is geographically expansive and is the world's ninth
largest country, its oil deposits are concentrated in the western half of the
state, with most located near or below the Caspian Sea. This anicle focuses
on the development agreements surrounding that region's largest oil field,
Tengiz, which alone accounts for more than a quarter of the country's total
oil production.

The few scholars who specialize in studying Kazakhstan lament the lack of
information regarding many areas of the Kazakh economy and its privatiza
tion agreements; this dearth ofdata also applies to the oil industry (Brill Olcott
2002; Peck 2004). In the Tengiz joint venture, however, Chevron is the prin
cipal negotiator and manager. As a U.S. corporation, Chevron is required by
its home country's laws to disclose legal and financial data. Because of this,
there is more information on the Tengiz oil field agreement than on any other
Kazakh/MNC contract.
Located on the northeastern shore of the Caspian Sea, the Tengiz oil field
was discovered in 1979, while Kazakhstan was still under Soviet rule. Devel
opment of this important underground field proved difficult even for the
technologically experienced Soviets; it is the deepest high-pressure deposit in
the world, with oil that emerges from the ground scalding hot, at a very high
pressure and laden with poisonous hydrogen sulfide, which must be removed
from the oil. Chevron, however, believed it possessed the technology to develop
this oil and entered into negotiations with Moscow in 1990 to do so.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Chevron continued negotiations
with the newly sovereign state of Kazakhstan, as the oil field was now located
within Kazakh borders. These negotiations were among the first undertaken
by Kazakhstan with a foreign firm. They commenced almost upon the state's
independence and concluded in 1993-which is notable, because it means
this contract not only preceded the passage of the country's first Law on Oil
and Gas {in 1995), but also predated the "Sale of the Century," widely
acknowledged to have begun in 1994. Moreover, despite that massive eco
nomic privatization campaign, it was not until 1996 that any further oil
industry sales or contracts were concluded. Thus, it is not difficult to make the
argument that Kazakhstan initiated its negotiations with Chevron without
a map.
In contrast to the nascent existence and economic inexperience embodied
by Kazakhstan, the Chevron Corporation was founded in 1879-then called
the Pacific Coast Oil Company-and by the mid-1990s had major operations
on six continents. It currendy ranks as the fourth largest oil concern in the
world, and the sixth largest global corporation overall (Fortune 2008).
The particular instances to which the game above refers involve the renego
tiating ofthe original contract initiated by Kazakhstan in November of2002
nearly a decade after the contract initially had been signed. The circumstances
surrounding Kazakhstan's desire for renegotiations closely resembled those
in Raymond Vernon's Obsolescing Bargain Model: the agreement had been
made, the investments were sunk, the oil was beginning to turn a profit for the
corporation, and the state started to feel that the distribution of benefits were
too much in favor of the MNC. The country called for renegotiations.

In fact, Kazakhstan already had made relevant, but not contractual,
demands of the oil corporation on three different occasions before calling for
the renegotiations. First, it had successfully levied a $5.8 million fine on
Chevron for excessive air pollution in 1997. The state also obtained a conces
sion from Chevron in 200 1 that mandated more responsible disposal of the
oil's sulfur by-product (Peck 2004). Another propitious encounter involved
securing the company's agreement to finance the relocation of an entire
village that was suffering ill environmental effects from Chevron's processing
plant. The success of these interactions-all evidence of learning, according
to Moran's theory-increased the government's confidence in its ability to
negotiate for further concessions from the company, this time contractual
ones. In the terminology of game theory, the interactions caused Kazakhstan
to recalculate both its reputation costs as well as the perceived likelihood that
Chevron would agree to both the renegotiations and to concessions.
In such an event, the renegotiations in question were not a simple affair, and
likely did not progress as Kazakhstan had predicted. The renegotiations
involved the financing arrangements for major gas processing and recycling
projects designed to reduce pollution as well as for projects designed to increase
production at the TengizChevroil venture. Looking back at the game, it may
seem surprising that Chevron would shut down its operations in protest of the
renegotiations. Yet, initially, it did. This can be explained, however, as the
result of Chevron's following through on its threat, and being taken by sur
prise that Kazakhstan indeed demanded renegotiations. After recalculating its
costs, expected value, and strategic play, and given the strategy revealed by the
State's move, Chevron reversed its decision after just two months. TengizChev
roil's operations were resumed in January of 2003, with Chevron agreeing to
some revisions in the contractual terms.
This game illustrates one instance of the state's bargaining with an MNC.
In order to establish a stronger case for progression along a learning curve,
more evidence of Kazakhstan's benefiting from increased strategic interactions
is preferable. Moran's case study of Chile graphed the state's increasing share
of copper profits over time; the results closely mirrored his predictions (see
Figure 1). As an alternate method for demonstrating Kazakhstan's progression
along Moran's learning curve, this article instead provides evidence of what
Moran considers learning: "developing negotiating, operating, and supervi
sory skills." Additionally, this method is arguably more comprehensive, since
it illustrates a developing country's gains that are not exclusively financial in
nature.

Evidence of Kazakhstan's Progression on the Learning Curve
This section provides additional evidence of Kazakhstan's progression on
Moran's learning curve, with concrete examples from further legislative initia
tives, environmental protection and enforcement, renegotiations, and the
ensuring of local employment on the part of Kazakhstan, which have taken
place since the initial renegotiations described in the case study above.
Although in 1991, at the commencement of the original TengizChevroil
negotiations, Kazakhstan had no legislation regarding oil and gas, it has since
passed a number of laws to regulate the industry. In 2003, the country intro
duced tougher rules for oil investors. On November 29, 2003, the Law on
Changes to the Tax Code was adopted. Kazakhstan also adopted a new land
code on June 20, 2003, and a customs code on April 5, 2003 (Petroleum
Economist 2003). In the same year, the state tax committee revoked two overly
generous VAT exemptions granted to the Agip-led consortium developing the
Kashagan field (Rigzone 2003). In November, 2007, in the midst of heated
renegotiations over the Kashagan oil fields, Kazakhstan's Parliament passed a
law allowing the government to abrogate an oil contract if it failed to live up
to its economic promise (Kramer 2008). In May 2008, a new oil-export duty
came into force, which was designed to increase the tax burden on oil and
mineral producers, and at the same time streamline the complex taxation sys
tem (although existing contracts and big foreign projects were to be exempt).
The government justified this law by asserting that the oil deals struck in the
1990s were too generous to foreign investors (Petroleum Economist 2007). Fur
ther increases in oil taxes are expected to be included in a subsequent revision
of the tax code to take place in the fall of2008 (Petroleum Economist 2008b).
Specifically regarding the environment, additional signals of learning
through successful strategic interactions include the government's ability to
compel Chevron to dispose of the sulfuric by-product from the Tengiz field in
a more environmentally secure manner, as mentioned above. Despite progress
in this area, the government was still unsatisfied with Chevron's actions, and
in October 2007, fined Chevron again, this time for $609 million, for impro
perly stockpiling and storing the sulfur by-products from 2003-2006 (Roberts
et al. 2007). Another important instance of Kazakhstan successfully making
demands ofMNCs was the 2000 TengizChevroil consortium commitment to
spend $2 billion creating additional oil-cleaning facilities and pumping natu
ral gas back into the oil reservoir instead ofcontinuing to flare it, which causes
considerable air pollution {Peck 2004). As of July 1, 2006, Kazakhstan out
lawed all such gas flaring within its borders, and continues to monitor and fine
offenders (Petroleum Economist 2008a).

Kazakhstan has also learned through its experiences that any call for rene
gotiations presents a risk: it faced a severe backlash in 2003 following renego
tiations with Chevron. Foreign corporations and governments alike expressed
both frustration and concern that future contracts would not be honored. They
pressured the Kazakh government not to renegotiate contracts, to the point
that, in October 2003, Kazakh President Nazarbayev stated, "Kazakhstan will
not revise present oil contracts signed with foreign investors but it will choose
those investors who will propose a greater Kazakh involvement in developing
new fields" (lnterfax-Kazakhstan 2003).
In addition to addressing foreign investor concerns, this announcement
indicated a new policy for Kazakhstan, one of mandating that foreign corpo
rations employ a certain percentage of both Kazakh employees and contrac
tors in their operations. This demonstrates Moran's concept of developing
operating skills and industry-specific technological skills. As evidence of the
policy's success, at the TengizChevroil workplace, SOo/o of the workforce was
Kazakhstani in 1993. By 2001 that percentage had reached 70o/o (Adamson
2001). Also, the number ofKazakhstani contractors and suppliers employed
by this consortium is increasing, and in 2000, a Kazakh drilling company was
awarded a contract for the first time (Peck 2004).
Perhaps no single event gives clearer evidence of progress according to
Moran's concept oflearning--developing negotiating, operating, and supervi
sory skills--than the establishment of Kazakhstan's National Oil Company,
KazMunaiGaz, in 2002, by Nurlan Balgimbayev, who was the Prime Minister
at the time. At its outset, this new company was given a mandate to control
no less than 50o/o ofthe ownership shares in future oil projects to be developed
with foreign companies. In 2004-2005, Parliament made this mandate into a
law (Campaner and Yenikeyeff2008). Since 2002, Kazakhstan has made great
strides in ensuring its active role in the energy sector through the activities of
its National Oil Company.
Kazakhstan has also managed to force renegotiations with other oil consor
tium members since the initial renegotiation with Chevron. The most notable
such instance concerns the Kashagan oil fields, which, like the Tengiz fields,
are also located beneath the Caspian Sea. Kashagan and Tengiz together account
for nearly half of the country's proven oil reserves (Campaner and Yenikeyeff
2008). There are many similarities between the situations at Kashagan and
Tengiz, which include the sulfuric nature of the oil and the complications
associated with extracting it; the degree of risk to the natural environment in
close proximity to the oil; and the government's call for the renegotiation of
production-sharing contracts.
The consortium charged with developing the Kashagan fields was formed in
1997, with Italian Oil Company (ENI) chosen as project operator by consor

tium partners in 2001, and oil production slated to begin in 2005. However,
when ENI doubled its budget estimates for the project and pushed back pre
dictions for the start of oil production to 2010 (current predictions are for
2013), the Kazakh government took action. First, it fined the consortium
$300 million for project overruns and environmental problems in 2005
(Roberts et al. 2007). Next, it pressured ENI by halting work at the oil field
for three months on environmental grounds (Reuters 2007), while simultane
ously initiating criminal proceedings against ENI's executives for alleged tax
evasion regarding the importation of oil-related equipment (Campaner and
Yenikeyeff 2008). Subsequendy, in January/February 2008, it called for rene
gotiation of the entire Production Sharing Agreement. The outcome of these
negotiations included the concession that ENI would eventually lose its role
as operator of the project, and that KazMunaiGaz would double its stake in
the field, becoming an equal partner with other consortium members (Exxon
Mobil, Shell, Total and ENI), each with a 16.81% stake in the field (Conoco
and Inpex hold the remaining shares). In a sign that negotiations are ongoing
phenomena, in late September of 2008, Shell and KazMunaiGaz announced
that their companies would form a joint venture to lead operations at the
Kashagan field, following the commencement of commercial operations in
2013 (Rayborn 2008). At the same time, Kazakhstan's Energy Minister
announced that in the new operation model, no less than 264 KazMunaiGaz
(Kazakh) employees will work at the project "at a very high level."
The game introduced above may be applied in the same way to these nego
tiations, with a similar outcome: evidence of bargaining gains on the part of
the developing country's government. In fact, all of the situations above
describe strategic interactions between Kazakhstan and MNCs, wherein
strategies for action were calculated and counter-strategies considered and
Kazakhstan came out having done better for itsel£ Each of these situations, in
other words, may be thought of as a game, and may be analyzed in such a
fashion. In this way, Kazakhstan can better understand its strategic possibili
ties, rationally plan its moves, and benefit by advancing along its "learning
curve" for strategic interaction.
Conclusion

This article applied Theodore Moran's dynamic bargaining theory-that devel
oping countries do better for themselves over time, as their experience with
bargaining and doing business grows-to the specific case of Kazakhstan. It
showed that game theory, and specifically Bayesian Equilibrium Analysis, can
be a useful methodology for states to employ in this development interface, as
it forces each player to take into consideration not just its own position, but

all the possible strategies and moves of its opponent, before making its own
strategic move. Once a move has been made, and a preference revealed, the
player can adjust its beliefs, recalculate the expected probabilities and
values, and better plan its next move.
A further argument for the use of such modeling of strategic interaction,
particularly for developing countries, is that formal modeling forces a thor
ough analysis of the situation at hand. This modeling, as a result, obligates the
player to state its knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs in entirety, as well as its
knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions about the other player at every potential
stage of the game. Doing so may expose unstated assumptions, reveal a gap in
the knowledge about the game or about the other player, or even lead to the
realization of alternate moves or superior strategies. A complete knowledge of
the game allows a player to act rationally in a consistent manner and, as in the
game described above, to readjust beliefs as events change and eventually dis
cover a way to do better for itsel£
If a developing country systematically applies a rigorous methodology to
analyze its strategic interactions, it may be possible to proceed more quickly
along its learning curve, or along a steeper curve. It is this possibility for devel
oping countries to accelerate their own rate of learning, through use of formal
game modeling, that this article has attempted to illustrate. In this way, it may
be possible for other newly sovereign states, such as other resource-rich former
Soviet states or for new entrants to the world extractive resource market, to
gain more, and do so more quickly, from their strategic interactions with
extractive MNCs.
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